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 Religion is an important determinant of the socioeconomic behavior of individuals.  This 
thesis is an attempt to describe how various religious denominations in the United States have 
differing levels of education, different patterns in college degree attainment, and different 
household incomes even when certain demographic factors are controlled.  This thesis describes 
differences in economic outcomes among religions and uses regression models of college 
attainment and average years of education with demographic controls including race, gender, 
region, and parents’ educational attainment from the early 1980s through 2012.  The results 
suggest that differences in economic attainment between American religious denominations in 






There is a documented history across America and globally of different religious groups 
demonstrating different characteristics in terms of income, education, wealth, and other 
attributes.  This paper is an update demonstrating how education and household income differ 
across religious denominations in the United States based on data from the General Social 
Survey (“GSS”) from 1983 to 2012.  Differences among religions in the United States in terms 
of educational attainment and household income are persistent and stable across the three 
decades of data analyzed.  When key demographic characteristics are controlled for, educational 
disparities across religions remain.  Across all tests, respondents adhering to Judaism, 
Unitarianism, and the Episcopal faith tended to outperform other religious denominations, 







In 2005, Christian Smith and Robert Faris produced a paper for the Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion entitled “Socioeconomic Inequality in the American Religious System: An 
Update and Assessment.” 1  The Smith Faris Paper compared religious denominations across the 
United States in terms of education, household income, and occupational prestige finding 
significant disparities across the various denominations.   
 
This paper is an update and extrapolation of the Smith Faris Paper to include data from the 2010-
2012 GSS as well as consideration of other demographic characteristics in conjunction with 
religion to explain the education and income related findings.   
  
                                                 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
As described above, Smith and Faris previously described measures of inequality and 
socioeconomic status across religious denominations in the United States, finding “that 
socioeconomic inequality in the American religious system has been persistent and stable.”2  The 
Smith Faris Paper describes stratification related to religious denominations in the United States, 
but does not delve deeply into possible explanations for disparities found.  The literature contains 
studies linking economic outcomes such as inequality, educational attainment, household 
income, and other measures to various religious sects and belief systems.  It is difficult to link 
economic outcomes to religious belief and values because of the difficulties in obtaining accurate 
data on people’s beliefs, particularly for something as personal and difficult to quantify as faith.  
Most research on religion and growth “has paid little or no attention to the role of religiosity” or 
the degree to which people adhere to their religions.3  Rather, analysis can only be done on what 
people self-report on their religious beliefs and behavior.  It is easier to quantify and analyze 
simple factors such as religious denomination than the extent of people’s religiosity.  
Nevertheless, the literature has many examples of demonstrated links between religion and 
measurable economic outcomes. 
                                                 
2 Smith-Faris, 2005, p. 95. 





Perhaps the most famous hypothesis related to religion and economic outcomes is the case of the 
“Protestant Ethic.”  Since at least the early 1900s, certain pro-capitalist ideals have been 
described as the Protestant Ethic.4  The Protestant Ethic and Protestantism in general are 
frequently cited as being conducive to growth and economic achievement.5  The Protestant faith 
explicitly encourages hard work and saving, which are intrinsically related to economic 
attainment and upward mobility.  For example, an important Protestant sermon from the 
eighteenth century often cited as being influential and formative6 entitled “The Use of Money” 
lays out economic guidelines.7  These include gaining all you can, saving all you can, and giving 
all you can, subject to limitations on the types of economic activities in which Protestants should 
engage.8  To the extent Protestants practice these guidelines, increased economic performance 
should be found.    
 
It should be noted that the theory of the Protestant Ethic is not universally accepted.  Weber 
himself attributed European capitalism’s success and correlation with Protestantism to additional 
factors such as western cities and double-entry bookkeeping, for example.9  There are 
explanations other than the Protestant Ethic for economic gains attributed to the religion.  For 
example, a 2007 study suggested that Protestantism promoted affluence through its 
encouragement of literacy (in comparison with Catholicism) rather than the character traits 
                                                 
4 Weber, 1930. 
5 For example, see McCleary, 2009, pp. 3 – 4.  Interestingly, while Protestantism has been found to positively 
influence economic outcomes, conservative forms of Protestantism are negatively related to economic outcomes 
as described below.   
6 For example, see McCleary 2009, p. 2 
7 Wesley, 1744. 
8 Wesley, 1744. 




discussed above.10  Despite these and other criticisms, the Protestant Ethic and its apparent 
correlation with positive economic outcomes has been widely studied and reported on.   
 
Some recent research has found results supporting the idea of the Protestant Ethic.  For example, 
a fascinating 2010 paper on religious identity salience found, among other effects, a correlation 
between Protestantism and contributions to public goods not found in other denominations such 
as Catholicism.11  A different study on participants’ willingness to work at group activities 
hypothesized that the Protestant Ethic might have “special relevance to one’s willingness to exert 
effort in situations that allow an opportunity to take it easy” and found that the Protestant Ethic 
seemed to moderate “social loafing” in participants.12  Research abounds on the vaunted 
Protestant Ethic and its measurable effect on economic outcomes and behavior.   
 
The values attributed to Protestantism are just one possible way that religion has been shown to 
affect measurable and quantifiable economic outcomes.  Other values encouraged by forms of 
Protestantism (and other religions) are less conducive to economic attainment, or affect it in 
different ways.   
Values 
Values encouraged or discouraged by various religions affect adherents profoundly as they grow 
up in their faith and become participants in the United States and global economy.  Religions can 
“reinforce character beliefs such as hard work, honesty, thrift, and the value of time” in their 
                                                 
10 Becker and Wößmann, 2007, p. 30. 
11 Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher, 2010, pp. 22-23. 




adherents.13  To the extent that, all else equal, religious beliefs encourage values that are 
conducive to economic attainment (in terms of income, wealth, upwards mobility, education, or 
prestige, for example), religions professing such beliefs should have measurably better educated, 
more productive, and wealthier adherents.  A few specific examples where religious values have 
been found to affect quantifiable financial or economic behavior are as follow: 
 A 2011 study indicated that in the Netherlands, religious households tended to save more 
than less religious households, and Catholic households were less likely to invest in 
stocks, although these results may not be applicable worldwide.14 
 Using game theory techniques and religious identity salience priming, a 2010 study found 
a correlation between Judaism and work ethic in terms of measured work effort.15 
 A 2008 study found that Americans raised in conservative Protestant families had 
“significantly fewer adult assets than those raised in Catholic and mainline Protestant 
families, even when a large number or other factors are controlled,” possibly due to 
conservative Protestant views that all money ultimately belongs to God and clergy are 
appropriate sources of financial advice.16 
 A country-level study found that when the level of religious participation is held constant, 
“belief in hell, heaven, and an afterlife… tend to increase economic growth.”17 
These are just a few examples of recent research finding measurable effects of religious values 
on economic outcomes.  Religious teachings and values have real-world effects that can be 
encouraged or discouraged by religious organizations and communities. 
                                                 
13 McCleary, 2009, p. 4. 
14 Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011, p. 105. 
15 Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher, 2010, p. 3. 
16 Keister, 2008, pp. 1242, 1251. 





Regardless of adherence to or beliefs in values promoted by religious sects, religion can foster 
close-knit communities, which have been found to be conducive to upwards mobility and 
positive economic outcomes.  Key benefits of participation in religious communities include 
youth support and networking opportunities.   
 
Religious communities often have support for children and young adults, giving them a group of 
perhaps like-minded peers, older mentors, and opportunities.  A 2004 paper cites and 
summarizes several studies linking religiosity in young people with better outcomes, including 
lower rates of juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, and depression, as well as later “sexual debut.”18  
Religious institutions are good at keeping kids out of trouble and in school, leading to better 
economic outcomes later at both individual and community levels.  This support and community 
for youth does not have non-religious substitutes in many areas.   
 
Religious congregations inherently function as networks of members, promoting trust and 
effective business relationships.  A congregation can support its members and collectively 
provide more opportunities for more people than individuals without such a community have 
access to.  Research has been done comparing community effects across religions depending on 
their collectivist versus individualist views.  A 1994 paper discusses how collectivist and 
individualist societies adopt different institutional structures, resulting in different economic 
outcomes by comparing two cultures and their shipping industries’ institutions with a game 
                                                 




theory approach.19  One culture was part of the more collectivist Jewish community while the 
other was individualistic and Christian.  The Jewish society more readily shared information and 
collectively punished defectors and cheaters than the Christian culture, at least not without more 
formal institutions.  To the extent more collectivist religious communities foster strong business 
relationships and networking, economic outcomes can be expected to be positively affected.   
Family Structure 
Various religions affect economic outcomes through their stances on family issues including 
family size and gender equality (or lack thereof).  Certain religions, notably Catholicism and 
Mormonism, emphasize “pronatalist ideologies” while others have traditionally smaller family 
units.20  It is established that across cultures and religions, “the smaller the family… the more 
parents will invest in their children.”21  This could mean, for example, more education or 
nutrition, depending on local conditions.  To the extent that smaller households improve 
economic outcomes, it would seem that pronatalist religions might harm adherents economically.  
 
Pronatalist ideologies tend to cause families to form earlier, and to begin having children earlier.  
This can have an effect of educational attainment to the extent women attend less college as a 
result of having children at an earlier age.  For example, a 2013 study on fertility and income 
among the LDS and non-LDS population in Utah found a correlation between higher levels of 
education among women and low fertility, and found LDS women likely to have more children 
                                                 
19 Greif, 1994 (throughout). 
20 Lehrer, 2004, p. 711. 




than non-LDS women.22  These results are unsurprising given the LDS faith’s famous emphasis 
on large families.   
Education 
Religions also encourage or discourage education to different degrees.  For example, a 2004 
study found significantly different mean years of schooling between different denominations, 
with Jews having the highest at over 15 years for both men and women.23  While education is 
important in some faiths, it is less encouraged in others.  A 2004 study, for example, found that 
fundamentalist Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants were less likely to be college educated 
than other religious groups, possibly due to the sects’ perception that higher education is hostile 
and challenging towards faith.24  To the extent various religions place a different emphasis on 
education, these results should be quantifiable in terms of educational attainment and eventual 
income among adherents. 
Value of Time 
Time spent at church or other religious services25 carries with it an economic opportunity cost.  It 
is self evident that an hour of time spent at religious activities is an hour that could be spent 
working and earning income.26  To the extent time spent at religious activities crowds out or 
replaces time spent on school or career related activities, economic outcomes would be expected 
to be dampened with all else being equal.  Church attendance and secular activities including 
commerce are substitutes in terms of peoples’ time.  A 2006 study found that when states 
repealed laws restricting commerce on Sundays, it “substantially increases the opportunity cost 
                                                 
22 Stanford and Smith, 2013, p. 242. 
23 Lehrer, 2004, p. 714. 
24 Beyerlein, 2004, p. 514. 
25 Throughout I refer to religious services of all types as “church” for brevity.   




of religious attendance by offering alternatives for work, leisure, and consumption” and that this 
change led to less religious participation and donations.27  Church attendance also crowds out 
economic performance.  For example, one study determined that, “economic growth responds 
positively to the extent of religious beliefs… but negatively to church attendance.”28  Attendance 
at religious services can dampen economic performance at the individual or community level and 
economic opportunity costs factor into religious participation decisions. 
Effects of Economic Attainment on Religion 
As religion affects economic outcomes, economic performance has been shown to affect 
religious belief.  For example, religion provides reassurance to people and can be “an important 
source of material support for those in need.”29  A 2011 study found results indicating inequality 
might drive religiosity, rather than the reverse.30  In fact, the relative power theory suggests that 
“greater inequality yields more religiosity by increasing the degree to which wealthy people are 
attracted to religion and have the power to shape the attitudes and beliefs of those with fewer 
means.”31  Clearly separating the effects of religion on economic factors and vice versa is not 
always obvious, even when data is available on values and beliefs.   
  
                                                 
27 Gruber and Hungerman, 2008, pp.  831 and 832. 
28 Barro and McCleary, 2003. 
29 Solt, Habel, and Grant, 2011, p. 448. 
30 Solt, Habel, and Grant, 2011, p. 462. 





DATA AND MODELING 
Data for this analysis comes from the General Social Survey (GSS),32 as it did for the Smith 
Faris Paper.  The GSS surveys American adults on attributes including demographics, economic 
status, beliefs, and attitudes.  This analysis uses data from the 1983-1984, 1998-2000, and 2010-
2012 surveys.   
 
This analysis relies on the following variables from the GSS: 
Table 1 - GSS Variables 
Variable Description33 
DEGREE RS HIGHEST DEGREE 
DENOM SPECIFIC DENOMINATION 
EDUC HIGHEST YEAR OF SCHOOL COMPLETED 
MAEDUC HIGHEST YEAR SCHOOL COMPLETED, MOTHER 
PAEDUC HIGHEST YEAR SCHOOL COMPLETED, FATHER 
RACE RACE OF RESPONDENT 
REALINC FAMILY INCOME IN CONSTANT $ 
REG16 REGION OF RESIDENCE, AGE 16 
RELIG RS RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE 
SEX RESPONDENTS SEX 
YEAR GSS YEAR FOR THIS RESPONDENT 
 
These variables were largely available for most respondents in each of the three survey periods.  
The GSS data was analyzed as follows.   
                                                 
32 http://www3.norc.org/gss+website. 





The demographic variables considered included the respondents’ gender, race, parents’ 
education, and region of residence at age 16.34  Dummy variables were created for gender and 
each of the races included in the GSS data.35   
 
Region at age 16 was selected to best reflect regional characteristics since many respondents 
would change regions as adults and the regional effects would be more relevant for a 
respondent’s formative (i.e. pre-16) years.   The GSS data includes ten different regions, which 
was more detail than required for this analysis.36  The GSS dataset, while large, contained 
prohibitively few respondents for certain characteristics when the data was broken down in terms 
of factors like region, race, and religion.  Many categories would become too sparse for 
meaningful analysis if the full number of region categories were used.  The ten region at age 16 
categories were consolidated into five more general regions based on Census regions.37  Dummy 
variables for each of the five region at age 16 variables were created and used to facilitate this 
analysis.  The following table shows the number of respondents in each of the five regions in 






                                                 
34 Data on family income at age 16 did not appear to be available within the GSS data set for all periods and was 
excluded, although this could be an interesting variable to compare and control for.   
35 Black, white, and other.  Further research on more nuanced racial categories could be edifying.   
36 The REG16 categories include e. nor., e. sou., middle a, mountain, new engl, pacific, south at, w. nor., w. sou., 
and foreign.     












This analysis follows the Smith Faris Paper in comparing measures of economic performance 
and (in)equality across religious denominations in the United States.  Specifically, the percent of 
respondents with a college degree, mean adult education, and mean household income are 
evaluated.  The Smith Faris Paper also analyzed occupational prestige, but this variable was not 
available for the entire time period in this analysis, and was excluded.   
 
Percent of respondents with a college degree was calculated based on the “degree” variable.  A 
college degree variable was created which distinguished between respondents with at least a 
college degree (i.e. the degree variable was noted as bachelor or graduate) and those without.38  
The years of education variable was used to calculate the mean years of education excluding 
respondents without available answers.  The final economic characteristic, household income, 
was based on the family income in constant 1986 dollars.  This analysis excluded respondents 
without real income information provided. 
                                                 
38 Several respondents were categorized as “unknown” because their degree information was not included.   
Region at Age 16 1983-1984 1998-2000 2010-2012 Total 
North-East 670 1,196 720 2,586 
South 938 1,801 1,238 3,977 
Mid-West 956 1,462 994 3,412 
West 370 825 672 1,867 
Foreign 138 365 394 897 





The GSS variables for religion and denomination were used to create broad religious categories, 
as shown on Table 3.39  These categories largely follow the categories included in the Smith 
Faris Paper, although it was unclear how certain religious groupings were reconciled by Smith 
and Faris.  It should be noted that not all religious categories were reflected each year in the 
GSS, and categorization may have changed between surveys.    
  
                                                 
39 Certain religious categories were excluded by Smith and Faris and in parts of this analysis because of inconsistent 
data across periods.  For example, the 1983-1984 GSS data does not include the Buddhism, Hinduism, or Muslim 






The following sections address the results of comparisons across denominations and 
demographic characteristics.  It should be noted that this analysis is limited by the number of 
respondents in certain categories.  For example, there were only eight Unitarian respondents in 
both the 1983-1984 and 2010-2012 GSS surveys.  This sparseness of information is particularly 
limiting when results are further broken down based on demographic characteristics.  Few 
respondents for a given category cause the results to be much less generally applicable.  For 
clarity, each table shows denominations for which there were fewer than ten responses for any 
period/demographic combination on the table in gray.   
 
Household income was excluded from demographic comparisons and analysis since household 
level information would not be particularly related to the individual respondents’ gender, race, or 
region at age 16. 
Percent with a College Degree by Denomination 
As shown in the Smith Faris Paper and Table 4 to this paper, the percent of each religious 
denomination with a college degree varied widely across the GSS data.  In the 2010-2012 period, 
the percent college educated varies from 66.2% for Jewish respondents to 11.5% for Jehovah’s 




Assembly of God faith leapt from a low ranking of 14 of 15 in the earlier surveys to 9 of 15 in 
the most recent survey.   
Mean Adult Education by Denomination 
Table 5 below compares the religious categories of respondents on the basis of each religion’s 
mean years of adult education.  As shown, these results are predictably similar to those showing 
the percent college educated.  Unitarians had the highest mean adult education for all three 
periods, and the lowest mean years of education was for respondents in the Assembly of God 
(1983-1984 and 1998-2000) and Adventists in 2010-2012. 
Mean Household Income by Denomination 
Table 6 compares religious denominations on the basis of their mean household income.  In each 
period, the highest earning religious denomination was Jewish.  The lowest were Assembly of 
God (1983-1984), Adventist (1998-2000), and American Baptist (2010-2012).  Rankings were 
fairly consistent across time periods, although Unitarians and American Baptists both fell in 
ranking in the latest period.   
Comparisons by Gender 
Table 7 and Table 8 further demonstrate education differences across religious denominations 
broken down by gender.  Predictably, males were more likely to have a college degree than 
females, although only by one percent in 2010-2012 compared to 6.9% in 1983-1984.  Of the 
denominations with sufficient data,40 the disparity between male and female college degree 
status was most pronounced in Episcopal respondents in 2010-2012 with 63.9% of males and 
                                                 
40 As mentioned above, denominations for which any period/demographic category had fewer than ten responses on 




34.4% of females having a college degree.  Female Black Baptist and ELCA respondents were 
slightly more likely than their male counterparts to have a college degree in 2010-2012.   
 
Table 8 compares religious categories by period and gender based on average years of adult 
education.  These results are similar to the percent college educated, as expected.  Interestingly, 
in the 2010-2012 period, the average years of education was higher for females than males in 
total, although not to a great degree.   
Comparisons by Race 
Comparisons of religions and race by college attainment and years of education are shown on 
Table 9 and Table 10 respectively, to the extent that GSS data was available.  The majority of 
these tables are shown in gray, as the only denomination to have at least ten responses for each 
period/race combination was Catholicism.  As mentioned preciously, the GSS data became 
sparse when multiple demographic characteristics were compared.  Very few participants in the 
GSS were noted as “other” race in any period.  Respondents categorized as white tended to have 
greater frequencies of college degrees and more years of education than black respondents across 
most religions.   
Comparisons by Region at Age 16 
Table 11 and Table 12 compare educational attainment across the various religious categories 
and the five regions described above.  The religious denominations were highly regional, and the 
only categories to have at least ten responses in each region/period combination were 
Catholicism and the Non-Religious.  Among Catholics in the most recent survey, those from the 
Mid-West were most likely to have a college degree.  In the Non-Religious category, the most 




South were least likely to have a college education in 2010-2012 and those from the North-East 
the most likely.  Similar trends are shown for mean years of adult education, to the extent data is 
available.   
Regression of College Education 
Table 13 shows the results of regressing a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
respondent had at least a college degree on demographic and religious variables.41  As shown, 
when gender, race, parents’ education, and time period are controlled for,42 religions most likely 
to have college educated adherents included Buddhism, Unitarianism, and Judaism.  
Respondents least likely to possess a college education were Jehovah’s Witnesses.  These results 
were generally consistent across the three time periods. 
Regression of Years of Education 
Table 14 shows a similar regression model with years of education as the independent variable.  
As shown, these results are similar to those shown in Table 13 for college degree attainment.  
Unitarian, Buddhist, and Jewish respondents had the greatest number of years of education in 
this model.  Jehovah’s Witnesses generally had the fewest.43  These results were generally 
consistent across time periods.  Interestingly, with the demographic factors controlled for, in the 
latest survey Jewish respondents did not outperform other denominations in terms of years of 
education to the extent shown in Table 5 without demographics considered. 
  
                                                 
41 Table 13 and Table 14 show statistical significance by the number of stars next to each coefficient: 10% level (*), 
5% level (**), or 1% level (***). 
42 Throughout this analysis, dummy variables for respondents who were female, foreign at age 16, of “other” race, 
or categorized as other Protestant or other Christian were not included to avoid excessive specification of 
redundant dummy variables. 






This analysis suggests that there are persistent trends among religious groups in the United States 
in terms of educational attainment and income.  These trends have persisted largely unchanged 
for three decades since the early 1980s, and are not accounted for fully by demographic 
characteristics such as race, gender, parents’ education, or region of the United States.  Across all 
tests performed, some religions such as Judaism have consistently outperformed others such as 
the Jehovah’s Witness faith, even with certain demographic factors controlled for.  This indicates 
underlying religious values or other characteristics could play an important role in economic 
outcome disparities between faiths.  To the extent data is available, further analysis could be 
performed to examine beliefs underlying these educational and income disparities and further 
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Table 3 - Count of Respondents 
 
Religion RELIG DENOM 1983-1984 1998-2000 2010-2012
Adventist protesta other 16 25 17
American Baptist protesta am bapt 16 41 23
Assembly of God protesta other 16 29 14
Black Baptist protesta 10 20 85 31
Black Baptist protesta nat bapt 14 51 11
Catholic catholic .i 814 1384 926
ELCA protesta am luthe 35 70 14
ELCA protesta evangeli 0 50 31
ELCA protesta luth ch 5 28 15
Episcopal protesta episcopa 65 112 68
Jehovah's Witness protesta other 23 43 26
Jewish jewish .i 70 113 65
LDS protesta other 66 32 31
Non-Religious none .i 224 794 750
Presbyterian USA protesta presbyte 103 107 71
Presbyterian USA protesta united p 31 44 15
Southern Baptist protesta southern 107 500 260
Unitarian protesta other 8 18 8
United Methodist protesta united m 126 374 161
Buddhism buddhism .i 0 26 24
Hinduism hinduism .i 0 13 13
Muslim moslem/i .i 0 25 24
Other Christian christia .i 0 72 120
Other Christian christia dk 0 0 6
Other Christian christia no denom 0 0 84
Other Christian orthodox .i 0 22 14
Other/NA dk .i 0 6 6
Other/NA inter-no .i 0 36 22
Other/NA na na 16 33 14
Other/NA native a .i 0 7 8
Other/NA other .i 46 70 45
Other/NA other ea .i 0 3 8
Other Protestant protesta afr meth 8 47 13
Other Protestant protesta baptist- 398 290 312
Other Protestant protesta dk 0 2 6
Other Protestant protesta lutheran 188 113 85
Other Protestant protesta methodis 165 60 51
Other Protestant protesta na 2 29 2
Other Protestant protesta no denom 102 228 217
Other Protestant protesta other 320 406 341
Other Protestant protesta other ba 43 158 35
Other Protestant protesta other lu 7 35 5
Other Protestant protesta other me 12 20 5
Other Protestant protesta other pr 5 28 7
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